Today, on the day of the 20th anniversary of declaration of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic’ s (NKR) independence, the NKR presidential press service reported that Bako Sahakyan sent a congratulatory telegram to the President of Moldavian Republic of Transnistria (MRT) Igor Smirnov.

Congratulating “the brotherly people” of MRT on the 21st anniversary of independent statehood, Bako Sahakyan noted that ''over these years, the people and authorities of Transnistria resolved the hardest issues of state building, protected the country's liberty and independence, laid a foundation of the dynamic economic development and embarked on the path to international recognition”.

It’s а grand occassion today - the 20th anniversary of the NKR’s independence. Why should such a telegram with such content have been sent to Igor Smirnov on such a day? If there was no way to avoid sending a telegram for some reasons, he might have confined himself to a brief message reading that the NKR President congratulated the MRT President, and might have done without “succulent” quotes.

People who keep track of the situation in the post-Soviet space know that unlike the NKR Transnistria is not ruled by elected authorities but by a regime which is referred to as semi-criminal. The regime is so far from democratic principles that it doesn’t apparently count on international recognition.

In December 2001, the NKR Foreign Ministry commenting on the report on the unrecognized states’ intention to establish a military bloc stated: “The NKR owns enough military potential to ensure its security and it doesn’t need any additional forces at all”. And in September 2002, the NKR Foreign Ministry called the statement of Southern Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity on preparations of other unrecognized states for holding joint military exercises “an absolutely unauthentic one”.

Long before Georgian-Russian war in 2008, the West held a firm position that the fight for self-determination had nothing to do with conflicts in the Southern Ossetia and Transnistria as Russia used these regimes as levers in its relations with Georgia and Moldova.

In late July 2004, a group of U.S. experts from the Project on Transitional Democracies and The German Marshall Fund of the U.S. visited Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, Georgia, Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. The experts were accompanied by the Economist writer Robert Cottrell who wrote the following based on the results of the visit to regions of conflict:

“Karabakh is a special case. Russia's role there is important, but secondary. For the other three frozen conflicts, persuading Russia to cooperate will be three-quarters of the work needed to find a solution: the regimes in Transdniester, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia survive thanks only to Russian military and diplomatic support”.

Over the recent several years, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs stated repeatedly in a direct or indirect way that Nagorno Karabakh is a special case among post-Soviet conflicts and it required a special setllement. And the fact that the international community is ready to recognize the NKR people’s right of self-determination and offers to hold a referendum is the best proof.

To all appearances, Stepanakert understood that it was senseless to establish virtual blocks with other unrecognized republics several years ago. Anyways, in June 2006, the NKR wasn’t presented at the meeting when the leaders of Abkhazia, Transnistria and Southern Ossetia met in Sukhumi and signed a declaration on establishing joint peacekeeping forces.

Leaving aside historical issues, the major fundamental difference between the Nagorno Karabakh’s authorities and regimes holding the power in Sukhumi, Tskhinvali and Tiraspol was and still is the democracy level. One can hardly find a foreigner who visited Karabakh and one of the three unrecognized republics and didn’t pay attention to the tremendous difference in their democratic and economic development.

Against this background, it’s not quite clear why such a telegram should have been sent especially on such a day. I would like to hope that it’s just resulted from not quite professional work of the NKR presidential press service and protocol and doesn’t bear witness to the change of policy according to which the Karabakh conflict is unique in its essence as is our victory.

Ara Tadevosyan is the Director of Mediamax.