Mediamax’s interview with Jean-François Ratelle, a lecturer at the University of Ottawa

In February you participated in the discussion “Armenia and Georgia on the Edge” at Carleton University, where you stated that Armenia’s weak negotiating position is a key factor that could further impede negotiations. I think the situation has worsened since then – the parties announced the completion of the work on the peace treaty’s text, yet it seems that Azerbaijan is not interested in signing it and forwards new conditions.

For Armenia signing it as soon as possible is probably the optimal approach, but from an Azeri perspective, there is an incentive to drag things along and escalate demands before reaching the agreement.

Because there’s no pressure from the international community or from guarantors or mediators, Azerbaijan will use it to its advantage until it reaches a certain point where they gain what they expect to gain, except if they encounter pressure from Turkey or other regional actors. It would be surprising that in a winning context, Azerbaijan lowers its demands.

So, unfortunately, it’s a grim look for Armenia in the current situation.

Armenian Prime Minister had a telephone call with the U.S. Secretary of State this week and according to the State Department, they both stressed that escalation in any form is unacceptable. Do you think we can call this some kind of message to Azerbaijan?

I think we are getting closer to maybe a thin red line or some kind of a red line with regard to Azerbaijan violating international law. They were lucky so far not to have sanctions and pressure from the international community. An invasion to south of Armenia would probably be problematic, and I think maybe Secretary Rubio underlined this aspect.

But underlining this message as concrete pressure on Azerbaijan is something I would disagree. There is not a clear position taken by the American administration or any other countries to really put pressure on Azerbaijan. There’s no concrete mechanism to prevent Azerbaijan from using other avenues to pressure Armenia, whether in negotiation or international law, or with regard to prisoners of war.

I’m not optimistic that the international community, the American government, or other governments would be ready to take action to prevent Azerbaijan to continue what it has been doing since 2020.

Some Armenian experts suggest that, since the U.S. administration still does not have a clear strategy on how to deal with Iran, it will try to avoid any possible conflicts or escalations in the broader region.

There are different geopolitical changes happening - from the democratic backsliding in the US to Ukraine, to Iran. But what is common in all those things is that Armenia is always in a way on the back burner of those big discussions. If we reach a settlement in Ukraine, I’m not sure it is changing that much with regard to where Armenia is with regard to Azerbaijan. It does not place Armenia in a better position.

The fact that the Americans are looking more with regard to Iran and other players in the region brings interest in the region. But at the same time, I’m not sure it is placing Armenia in a better position to extract more from a peace treaty with Azerbaijan. The way to frame it right now is Armenia is seeking to lose as little as possible from this peace settlement.

Geopolitical events might put Armenia in a situation where it will lose less. But right now, I do not see Armenia having the backing of any major actors in order to re-engage a balance in the negotiation between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

I’ve seen a couple of articles recently claiming that if the war in Ukraine ends, it will enable Russia to “come back” to the South Caucasus. Although I do not think that Russia has left South Caucasus, but if such a “comeback” takes place, can Russia hinder the process between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

I don’t think that Russia is able to destabilize or force the South Caucasus in a certain way. Russia might want to do it, but might not have the resources to achieve that. I agree with you - Russia never left the South Caucasus, but at the same time, Russia does not have the ability to influence strongly on a military perspective.

We’ve seen in Syria and in Africa that Russia’s ability to project power outside of its direct borders, the Western borders, appears rather limited.

Turkish journalists visited Armenia recently, Margara checkpoint at the Armenian-Turkish border was opened for 10 days to deliver humanitarian cargo from Yerevan to Aleppo. Those were very small steps but even they created a lot of fuss with Azerbaijan. Do you think that Turkey may be ready for more significant steps?

Turkey will use as much as it can of its bargaining process with Armenia in order to leverage a better deal for Azerbaijan.

Armenia is in a position where everything is interconnected. And each time you have an additional piece, that piece is bringing Armenia in a weaker position in the negotiation process. So whether it is the relationship with Azerbaijan, the need to sign a peace agreement as early as possible, Turkey’s position, the end of the war potentially in Ukraine, Armenia’s isolation, all of that put together, none of those factors put Armenia in a stronger position to negotiate with Azerbaijan, unfortunately.

In the past, since 1994, there was always a balance in between the advantages and disadvantages of the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both sides had cards to play in the negotiation. The situation is different today.

So I do not think Turkey will move until the deal is reached. And because of that, Azerbaijan feels that they are empowered to increase their demand, to renegotiate after finding a first tentative agreement. And Armenia can’t prevent those recurring demands.

Of course, your position is not to advise the Armenian government, but what do you think can be done? You have already described the situation as “grim”, but do you see any room for manoeuvring for Armenia?

As you mentioned, I’m not here to give advice, I’m more there to analyze the situation.

For me, there are two very important points. I’m disappointed, but I understand the fact that Armenia has or is about to drop a lot of legal proceedings in front of the International Court of Justice and the ICC. For me, that is the red flag. That’s something I understand they have to give, but at the same time, it’ll be extremely costly in the long run.

But what needs to be preserved is a full control of Armenia and its own sovereignty. The idea of to open the door of a shared custody of a corridor where Armenia would relinquish part of its sovereignty, even minimally, is the most important red flag for me, the red line I would never cross.

If Armenia wants to survive, sovereignty is the sacred last aspect of it. Sovereignty in the region is really what keeps Armenia what it is. And if it would have to even give a little bit with regard to its borders, with regard to the corridor in southern Armenia, it would be a recipe for disaster. It would set the precedent and it would create a Trojan horse into the survival of Armenia on the long term.

Ara Tadevosyan talked to Jean-François Ratelle