Oliver Wolyniec is a master's student at Yale University and the topic of his master’s thesis is “Yerevan at a Crossroads: Armenia Between Russia and the West”.

As a Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies Fellow, Oliver is interested in Armenian foreign policy, geopolitical developments in the South Caucasus, and conflicts in post-Soviet spaces. Prior to Yale, he worked with Eurasia Foundation in Washington, D.C.

It seems that Armenia’s government has adopted a “Pivot to the West” approach in its foreign policy. However, with the re-election of Donald Trump and the evolving global dynamics, the term collective “West” seems outdated. How would you assess Armenia’s foreign policy strategy in this context? What, in your view, does Armenia's “Pivot to the West” actually signify?

It has only been a little under three months since Trump began his second term, and coupled with the unpredictability of his administration’s decision-making, it remains to be seen exactly what the U.S. approach to Armenia, and to the broader South Caucasus, will be – and whether he will commit the U.S. to the Charter on Strategic Partnership that the outgoing Biden administration signed with Armenia in January.

However, there is no doubt that Trump’s return to office means a broader retreat by the U.S. from the world stage, in line with his “America First” policy. So, I expect Armenia to try to pivot much more strongly to the European Union than to the U.S. and lean on France as its biggest advocate in the bloc.

Recently, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, emphasizing that a renewed escalation of tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan is unacceptable to the United States. Do you believe the U.S. may play an active role as a mediator in the peace process and apply pressure on Azerbaijan? How likely do you think it is that a peace treaty could be signed in the near future?

I don’t believe the U.S. will back up Secretary Rubio’s words with any significant action. Again, as the Trump administration turns its gaze inward – tariffs aimed at countless countries notwithstanding – it will show little interest in engaging actively in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process. And history has shown there to be little appetite among the leadership in Yerevan and Baku to enable outside actors to play key mediation roles, so such an outcome is highly unlikely. While I’m hopeful that a peace deal will finally be signed after nearly 40 years of on-and-off conflict, we’ve seen the two sides come close before. It could happen soon, but I’m skeptical.

Another key factor influencing the South Caucasus is the relationship between the U.S. and Iran. Does the Trump administration have a clear strategy regarding Iran? How do you think Trump will navigate pressure from Turkey and Israel if he seeks to improve relations with Iran?

Trump has a history of bellicose rhetoric on Iran, even recently threatening military action against Tehran if no deal is concluded that would place limits on Iran’s nuclear program and lift U.S. economic sanctions. But in the past few days progress appears to have been made in negotiations between U.S. and Iranian officials. I doubt Trump would be moved by Turkish entreaties as he seeks a diplomatic victory by making a deal with Iran, but he has been particularly sympathetic to Israeli requests in the past, so Israel may be able to influence any potential outcome.

At present, the U.S., Europe, and Russia continue to be over occupied with the war in Ukraine, leaving the South Caucasus somewhat sidelined. Do you think that this “inattention”  may end once the Ukrainian conflic ends? In this regard in what form do you think Russia will “comeback” to the South Caucasus and what kind of configuration between Russia and the US can be expected in the region?

I think this depends on how favorable any deal between Moscow and Kyiv may be for Russia. If it is able to secure the vast swath of Ukrainian territory it currently controls and weaken the Ukrainian leadership's capacity to limit Russian political influence in the country, the Kremlin might be less concerned about developments in the South Caucasus. If it emerges from peace talks feeling vulnerable, however, Putin may feel a sense of desperation and move more aggressively to keep Armenia and the rest of the region in its orbit. As long as the U.S. adheres to its current foreign policy approach and continues to look inward, the regional balance will be tilted in Russia's favor.

Armenia has not been exempt from the reciprocal tariffs imposed by the U.S. Since April 5th, a 10% tariff on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia has come into force. How do you think this decision will affect Armenia’s economic and foreign policy landscape?

I’m no economist, but I’d imagine that it will likely push Armenia even further toward the EU vis-à-vis the U.S. But Russia remains Armenia’s biggest trading partner, so the impact of the U.S. tariffs likely won’t be hugely significant.

Finally, considering your thesis on “Yerevan at a Crossroads: Armenia Between Russia and the West”, where do you believe Armenia’s foreign policy is headed in the future? What key factors will shape this trajectory?

As rocky as the path may be, I think Armenia has reached a point of no return with Russia and will continue its efforts to seek greater integration with the West. Moscow’s repeated failure to guarantee Armenia’s security in the last five or so years, culminating in Azerbaijan’s complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 as Russian peacekeepers stood by, has turned official and public opinion in Armenia firmly against Russia. The recent passing of a bill in Armenia’s parliament calling for EU accession was a tangible sign of this. However, that Armenia and Azerbaijan have not yet concluded a peace deal stands in the way of deeper ties with the West, as does Yerevan’s overreliance on Russia for its economic and energy needs. Only when Armenia finds a way to resolve or navigate these two particularly thorny issues will it be able to move indelibly in the Western direction.

Mariam Galstyan talked to Oliver Wolyniec