There is something distinctly hapless about the new leader of Turkey’s pro-secular main opposition Repub­lican People’s Party (CHP). Kemal Kilicdaroglu was recently spotted walking down an upward bound escalator. Footage of this faux pas, as it were, spread like wild fire across the Internet. Soon after, he called a lake in the eastern province of Van “a sea.” Far more consequentially, Kilicdaroglu was unable to cast his ballot in the September 12 referendum on set of government inspired constitutional changes that he opposed, because his party had failed to register his name. All of this, his detractors smugly contend, is proof that Kilicdaroglu can never be a match for the charismatic Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his conservative Justice and Devel­opment (AK) party. 

Kilicdaroglu’s ascension to the party leadership after a short and sharp battle with the Kemalist old guard was meant to improve the party’s fortunes. Yet, with only three months left before nationwide parliamentary elections, opinion polls consistently show AK leagues ahead of the CHP with over 46 percent of the popular vote. The same polls suggest that the CHP is stuck at 26 percent, only slightly above the 21 percent it took in the 2007 elections. 

The conventional wisdom is that eight years of economic growth and demo­cratic reforms will catapult AK to a third term of single rule. And should the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) fail to win the minimum 10 percent of the national vote as predicted by some surveys, the AK will have a strong enough majority to write a new constitution and ram it through without having to seek the CHP’s support. 

The scenario is a worrying one for those who claim that, unchecked by opposition, Erdogan is displaying an increasingly authoritarian bent. The more salient question is not whether Kilicdaroglu can defeat Erdogan - he cannot. It is whether he can be effec­tive as the leader of the main opposi­tion. 

Since taking over the party last May, the 63-year-old Kilicdaroglu has done a fair bit of flip-flopping. He declared he was in favor of lifting bans on the Islamic headscarf in universities. Yet he failed to show up at President Abdullah Gul’s Republic Day recep­tion in October, ostensibly because the generals who take issue with the first lady’s headscarf decided not to attend. Kilicdaroglu pronounced himself in favor of a general amnesty for sepa­ratist PKK fighters only to retract that statement days later. He has yet to articulate a clear policy on any major issue. He is neither charismatic nor worldly. But he has two sure vote-getters: an unassailable reputation for probity and the common touch. 

Shades of Obama 

Kilicdaroglu is a member of the minority Alevi sect that is particular to Turkey. (The Alevis are known for their liberal interpretation of Islam; they neither fast during Ramadan nor pray in mosques). He hails from a humble family in Tunceli, a largely Alevi and Kurdish province in the south­east that is notorious for its popular rebellions. His mother is said to be an ethnic Armenian. (His wife, a maternal cousin, must therefore be half Armenian.) Kilicdaroglu told me in an interview that he was not Kurdish but from a Turkmen tribe that migrated from Iran centuries ago. Yet his family speaks a Kurdish dialect known as Zazaki. 

This diverse background invites comparisons with President Obama. Yet, like Obama, the CHP leader plays his back­ground down and, despite it, managed to claw his way into the Turkish bureaucracy, where he held several influential posts. An economist by training, Kilicdaroglu rose through the ranks of the Finance Ministry and became the head of the Social Security Agency before entering politics in 1999. 

Much like Obama, Kilicdaroglu is seeking to strike a middle ground that can appeal to different strands of Turkish society. 

My impression is that Kilicdaroglu’s mild manner belies a steely determination, which was in evidence when he swept out much of the old guard during a recent party congress. Overriding fierce objections from residual conservatives, Kilicdaroglu appointed Sezgin Tanrikulu, a gutsy Kurdish human rights lawyer, as a deputy chairman. Although Kilicdaroglu prefers to frame the Kurdish problem as a socio-economic issue rather than an ethnic one, he has in recent weeks said he supports teaching Kurdish as a second language and, eventually, allowing instruction in Kurdish as well. He wants the national threshold for entering parlia­ment  to be lowered to six percent (it was designed to keep smaller, notably Kurdish parties out). Kilicdaroglu is also talking about establishing a truth and reconciliation commission to help heal the wounds inflicted by the long running Kurdish insurgency. Finally, unlike the MHP, he has not sniped at AK over secret talks held between govern­ment officials and the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. This, by CHP standards, declared a prominent Kurdish activist friend, is “nothing short of revolutionary.” Be they Alevis, Armenians, or Kurds, for all his claims be an “ordinary Turk,” one senses that deep inside, Kilicdaroglu feels empathy for fellow “others.” 

Veering West 

When the AK government agreed to go along with NATO plans to erect its so-called missile defense shield, the CHP barely uttered a peep. Ditto when the Wikileaks website published U.S. embassy cables documenting that the United States used Turkish bases for controversial “rendition flights” carrying Muslim “terror suspects.” Had Kilicdarog­lu’s predecessor Deniz Baykal been in charge, he would have not missed either opportunity to nail AK. 

Western diplomats confirm that under Kilicdaroglu, the long reclusive (and determinedly anti-western) CHP is finally reaching out. It has appointed point men to interface with Western embassies. Kilicdaroglu has made several trips to Europe and speaks warmly of Turkey’s EU membership. Although he has a shaky grasp of foreign affairs and speaks no foreign languages, he has picked able counselors in former ambassadors Osman Koruturk and Faruk Logoglu, both well-seasoned Atlanticists. Had it not been an election year, party insiders say Kilicdaroglu would have definitely travelled to Washington. Kilicdaroglu is also giving more prominence to women. There are a record 21 women in the CHP’s 80-member executive board. 

Election Strategy 

Does the CHP have an election strategy? Party officials vow that by March, the CHP will have unveiled a raft of policy papers that will make their strategy clear. But internal feuding is threatening to water down some of the bolder positions embraced by Kilicdaroglu, notably on the Kurds. Can he stand his ground? A related question is whether he can wean his party off its long-running dependency on the army and plot a truly independent course. That Kilicdaroglu does not pepper his speeches with references to Ataturk or specters of an Islamist takeover are hopeful signs of change. And, much like Obama, Kilicdaroglu is seeking to strike a middle ground that can appeal to different strands of Turkish society. The trouble is that he emerges sounding weak and indecisive.

He seems on surer ground when talking about the economy and, in particular, when courting the working class. Kilicda-roglu has pledged to provide cover for some 17 million Turks living below the poverty line and he is almost certain to attack the AK on allegations of graft. But as recent surveys show, he has yet to make a dent. This is because AK is doing so well (the economy is expected to grow by 5 percent this year), is far better organized, and wields the benefits of incumbency. And also because Erdoğan is unquestionably one of the most brilliant politicians in modern Turkish history. A further test of Kilicdaroglu’s sway will come when candi-dates’ lists are drawn for the June parliamentary elections. A crucial target is the Kurdish majority region where (with the exception of two provinces - Adiyaman and Ardahan) the CHP failed to win a single seat in the 2007 polls. Should the CHP get less than 25 percent of the national vote, a fresh battle for the party leadership is sure to erupt. What his foes and friends alike should know by now is that there is more to Kemal Kilicdaroglu than meets the eye. 

Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist.

Copyright 2011. “On Turkey” Series. The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved. GMF’s On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkey’s current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analy-sis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers.