In early November, a group of Armenian journalists traveled to Moldova on a study visit. I was among them, representing Mediamax. The purpose of the trip was to draw lessons from the Moldovan experience: in September this year, the pro-European Action and Solidarity Party won Moldova’s parliamentary elections, defeating the pro-Russian opposition.

During meetings in Chisinau with representatives of Moldova’s state institutions and civil society, we were told that the pro-European forces’ victory had been made possible by an effective response to the hybrid war waged by Russia against Moldova. In this effort, they received substantial support from Brussels. In the course of these discussions, it was repeatedly noted that the Moldovan experience could be useful for Armenia in the run-up to its upcoming parliamentary elections, in case Russia – seeking to preserve its influence in the region – attempts to employ similar tools, ranging from foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) to economic and political forms of leverage.

Parallels between the realities of Armenia and Moldova have been drawn frequently in recent months, but they gained renewed momentum following a statement by the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. As the situations of the two countries are equated and the West focuses on countering Russian influence, several realities of Armenia’s political situation are pushed to the margins. If these factors are overlooked, support from Brussels may not only fail to strengthen democracy in Armenia, but may even contribute to a process in which democracy erodes itself.

There is more than one aggressor

During one of our meetings in Moldova, a representative of a state institution repeatedly said to us: “I don’t know how things are in Armenia – you tell me – but in Moldova…” and then went on to describe the situation, without avoiding parallels with Armenia. Now I will speak in the same way: I do not know how things are in Moldova, but the realities in Armenia are clear to those of us living here.

When Moldovan officials speak about countering external interference, they mainly mean one country – the Russian Federation. The official we spoke with stated that Moldova is engaged in a full-scale hybrid war with Russia. This is where the first major difference lies. The hybrid war being waged against Armenia’s sovereignty is not confined to a single actor, and the primary aggressor in Armenia’s case is Azerbaijan, with Turkey’s support – sometimes quiet, sometimes outspoken.

She also noted that residents of the unrecognized Transnistrian region, as well as the autonomous territorial unit of Gagauzia, are highly vulnerable to Russian information attacks, and that Kremlin propaganda fuels unfounded hostility toward the Moldovan government. Emphasizing that internal conflicts in Moldova are purely the result of Russia’s information warfare, she posed a question which, in my view, was rhetorical: perhaps you, too, do not actually have a conflict with Azerbaijan, and it is merely a product of Russian propaganda?

As I said then, so I will say now: Armenia and Azerbaijan do have a conflict. And even if we were to wake up tomorrow in some parallel reality in which a country called Russia no longer existed, Armenia and Azerbaijan would still be in conflict – for one very simple reason: the survival of Azerbaijan’s authoritarian regime is built on hostility toward Armenia and Armenians. An examination of pan-Turkism helps explain the roots of this conflict.

If peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is assumed to already exist in Western capitals, let me offer a reminder: 

- In 2020, Azerbaijan launched an aggression against the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, violating the international consensus on the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

- In 2022, Azerbaijan attacked Armenia’s sovereign territory along the entire length of the border and continues to occupy approximately 250 square kilometers of Armenia’s territory.

- Beginning in December 2022, Azerbaijan imposed a blockade on the civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, which falls within the scope of genocide as defined in Article 2 (c) and (d) of the Genocide Convention.

- In September 2023, Azerbaijan attacked the besieged population of Nagorno-Karabakh and carried out the complete ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population.

- Armenian prisoners of war and political detainees continue to be illegally held and tortured in Azerbaijani prisons.

The list is far from exhaustive. At the same time, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and a number of senior officials continue, almost daily, to intimidate the Armenian people with the false concept of “Western Azerbaijan,” speak openly about settling Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Armenia, and put forward unacceptable and ever-expanding preconditions for signing peace.

Don’t you see a conflict here? All of this points to one clear conclusion: the normalization of crimes cannot lead to peace. 

Persecution of the Church as an attempt to entrench authoritarian rule

When discussing the FIMI tools employed by Russia in Moldova, those we spoke with also mentioned the church, noting that members of the clergy engage in pro-Russian propaganda. Moldova has two Orthodox churches, and according to those we spoke with, the one wielding greater influence is the Moldovan– Chisinau Metropolis of the Russian Orthodox Church, which explains the clergy’s ties to Russia.

From here, we once again arrive at a highly dangerous parallel. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is making every effort to present his campaign against the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church to Western audiences as a struggle against Russian influence. For the domestic audience, however, this is a losing argument. Society here knows the Church’s 1,700-year history – one that, put briefly, is about preserving the Armenian nation and statehood from foreign domination. This public perception is also reflected in the consistently high level of trust the Church registers in opinion polls.

To assess the situation accurately, it is enough to recall that the government’s campaign against the Church began in May of this year, following a conference held in Switzerland at the request of the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin. The conference focused on the rights of the Armenians of Artsakh and the preservation of Artsakh’s Christian heritage – issues that stand in direct contradiction to the policies pursued by Pashinyan.

The reality of systematic repression against the Church is further underscored by the fact that none of the legal cases against the four archbishops currently deprived of their liberty have any connection to foreign threats. Any discussion of the details of these cases becomes largely meaningless when one recalls that the arrests were accompanied by erratic and inappropriate public statements by the prime minister, effectively serving as direct guidance to law-enforcement bodies and the judiciary. At the same time, participants in anti-Church rallies are mobilized through the visible use of administrative resources.

In this context, foreign influence can indeed be identified – but to find it, one should look not toward Russia, but toward neighboring Azerbaijan. Over the past year in particular, numerous threats against the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church have been voiced from Azerbaijan, most notably by the chairman of the Caucasus Muslims Board, Sheikh-ul-Islam Allahshukur Pashazade. When one considers the “coincidental” overlap between these statements and the rhetoric and actions of Armenia’s ruling party, a legitimate impression emerges that the authorities themselves have become victims of foreign information manipulation and interference.

Counter-propaganda vs. Addressing deep-seated concerns

During our meetings in Chisinau, we were told that Russia closely studies society’s vulnerabilities and the concerns present among citizens, and then uses them to shape its propaganda in a way that turns the public against the government. In Moldova’s case, these vulnerabilities are primarily social issues, traditional values, and fears of being drawn into a war. One of our interlocutors noted that their response to Russian information attacks largely consists of promoting their own narratives.

In recent months, various expert studies have sought to outline the content of propaganda narratives directed at Armenian audiences, particularly on Russian Telegram channels. One of the main themes of this content concerns the “Turkification” of Armenia – the so-called vilayetization. In the rush to label such material as “Russian-Turkish” propaganda, an important question is left out of the discussion: why do messages of this kind resonate with Armenian society at all? Could it be that Armenian society genuinely feels this threat and is deeply concerned about the dangers posed by the ruling party’s policy of concessions? Are these concerns not justified against the backdrop of Turkish-Azerbaijani expansionist ambitions, the conversion of Christian monasteries in Turkey into mosques – or their destruction – and the fact that Armenian churches in Artsakh are now facing the same fate?

Foreign information flows can exploit public anxieties and fears. But society would not be so susceptible to them if those anxieties were not real and deeply rooted. The priority, therefore, should be not to pursue those who fish in muddy waters, but those who muddy the waters in the first place (to use an Armenian idiom).

What is actually undermining free elections in Armenia

According to our interlocutors in Moldova, Russia’s attempts to influence elections there included various bribery schemes, the creation of troll factories, and information attacks aimed at shaping public opinion. With support from Brussels, Moldova was able to counter these efforts, helping to strengthen the foundations of democracy and European values in the country.

If the West’s goal is also to ensure free elections and strengthen democracy in Armenia, then I would like to ask: are democratic and free elections possible in a country where opponents of the incumbent authorities are intimidated through unlawful searches and arrests? Are democratic and free elections possible in a country whose sitting prime minister proclaims himself to be the government, claims the right to interfere in the internal affairs of a Church that is constitutionally separated from the state, and does so by wielding the instruments of state power? Are free elections possible in a country where media outlets affiliated with the authorities “suddenly” publish illegally obtained wiretaps, character-assassination material, and content that incites hatred?

The choice facing Armenia’s citizens is already constrained by propaganda messages coming both from Azerbaijan and from an incumbent government seeking to entrench itself – messages that warn that unless voters back the ruling party, with its push for a new constitution and a so-called ‘peace’ agenda, the alternative will be war.

Democratic elections in Armenia are indeed under threat. But first and foremost, they must be protected from a political force that proclaims itself democratic while striving, at any cost, to perpetuate its own rule.

Gaiane Yenokian is a reporter at Mediamax.