So, now the incumbent President SerzhSargsyan of Armenia will be sworn in for a second term, not renewable under Constitution. Most probably, he will also be the last leader of the national liberation movement to become a President, as all others, himself including, will be of late retiring age by 2018. On the record, nation’s first President LevonTer-Petrosyan cited his age of 68 as a reason not to campaign in past February’s elections. As the first generation of political leaders retires, the nation faces the need to score the heritage of those most fiercely fighting both for independence in 1988-91 and NagornoKarabakh in the 1992-1994 war.

With a rare general election to enjoy quality assurance and acknowledgement from nation’s primary foreign partners – Russia, European Union and United States (positive signals were registered from China, India, United Kingdom and elsewhere either), it is the ripe moment to update foreign policy and national security priorities that President Sargsyan and his Administration may pursue in 2013-18, to lay solid foundation for the emerging democracy’s sustainable future.

First and foremost, the presidential run was characterized with an unprecedented (but not ideal) amount of freedom in campaigning and outreach for all candidates, equal to their political capital and resources. The media openness was an asset that strengthened the grassroots initiatives, like those later politicized green movements, and empowered the second-placed presidential candidate, former Foreign Minister RaffiHovhannisian, who keeps on building his political future. These signs of unlocking political landscape for ‘non-1988-movement’ personalities, like MrHovhannisian, who officially scored 37 per cent, and electorate’s positive attitude towards ‘new people’, is good news for those willing to run in 2018.

Along with domestic agenda, no doubt, the NagornoKarabakh issue and relations with Turkey will dominate in 2013-18 as primary geopolitical pivots affecting the very existence of Armenian statehood. Two landmark dates approach in this regards.

The stalemate with Turkey, following the ground-breaking success story with 2008-2010 rapprochement process, already abandoned by and large, will yet deepen closer to the Armenian Genocide (or ‘Great Dispossession’, as MrRaffiHovhannisian termed it) centennial in 2015. The mighty Armenian Diaspora, an important investor and financial supporter back home, will have emergingly loud voice in this affair, for a good reason. 

The year of 2015 is crucial psychological threshold for two reasons.

First, it still consolidates the power and resources of Diaspora pushing for Genocide recognition worldwide, and most prominently – in the United States. Along the lines, the Diaspora will also continue to hold a close eye on the achievements (and setbacks) of the Republic in first 25 years of its independence. Unable to hide behind young state institutions and lack of experience, Armenian political leadershipwill need to report whether it succeeded in making generations’ dream a reality and build up capacities not only for future genocide prevention, but also for national revival and sustainable economic development. The 2013 presidential campaign unveiled this new trend in Armenia-Diaspora relations.

Second, in 2014 Armenians will mark 20 years of victory in Karabakh war; and the ultimate question shall be if the country’s leadership has been able to build up a sustainable economy, effective institutions and all other necessary assets for development within 20 years of peace, which by all accounts is a remarkable time that may never repeat itself.

In the following years President Sargsyan shall need to work out a national consensus on the future of NagornoKarabakh Republic. So far wrongly ignored, in reality there is no any consensus (beyond well-written declarations and well-served Armenian toasts) whether NagornoKarabakh shall continue to remain a ‘foreign’ state, or Armenia intends to build up some form of confederation or union with tiny mountainous Republic of 150.000 people. If so, shall it be put down on a referendum, and when, where and how that shall be negotiated? This difference in ‘talking points’ with foreign partners and domestic audience has been exhausted in the recent decade, given the media revolution and other factors speeding global communication. Those active in international fora may have experienced this dozen times. Of course, this likely policy shift will affect OSCE-led negotiations, which have been stalled since Kazan (Russia) meeting in June 2011.

On the eve of 2015 Armenia shall also bravely deal with the daily anti-Armenian hatred and propaganda spread by Azerbaijani leadership both domestically and worldwide. I am personally of the firm belief, that the Safarov affair between Hungary and Azerbaijan has become possible majorly because of Armenia’s lazy efforts in countering anti-Armenian hate speech campaign by Azerbaijan. Beyond reasonable doubt, this propaganda negatively affects Armenians worldwide, who have for centuries, and especially after 1915, been hosted in foreign countries and built up good name of educated and law-abiding people. In mirror effect, this also weakens Armenia’s national security and efficiency of its foreign policy. Armenia shall draw a redline of tolerance towards this policy, which is against all norms of international humanitarian law that may have enabled any other country to solicit this to international courts.

The daily threats of Azerbaijan’s President IlhamAliyev ‘to get rid’ of Armenians not only from NagornoKarabakh de facto Republic, but also mainland Armenia; as well as unstable nature of MrAliyev’s dictatorship based on hydrocarbon revenues, will by no means raise the level of security threats to Armenia and in the whole region close to Iran. Given the inevitable decline of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas revenues already in 2014 (by the BP estimates), the threat of war will become more and more real.Unless a revolution breaks outin the course of presidential elections in October 2013, where MrAliyev plans to get re-elected for the third time (he abolished constitutional limits of reelection), the essential realpolitikstep for MrAliyev to keep his grip on power consolidated and public attention ‘busy’ will be a war with Armenia after cash flow slows down.

With this in mind, the second term of Sargsyan’s tenure may also become a presidency of war time. Apart from studying the military balance of respective parties, the more urgent question of the time is whether or not Armenia has realized the whole potential of two decades of peace and favourable international conjuncture. Given the problems in economy, weak institutions, extensive emigration and corruption seems likenot yet. Relieved of any domestic constraints after re-election, President Sargsyan shall either face this challenge and put foundations for irreversible reforms, rule of law and inalienable freedoms to cement his firm place in Armenian history, or may leave shaky heritage to the next generation incoming in 2017/18.

All the challenges in international arena, not limited to those exposed here, have been growing and transforming in the past years, leaving the foreign policy doctrine of Armenia as it was laid out in 2000s. A strong reassessment of National Security Strategy, adopted in 2007 by outgoing President Robert Kocharian, may be a visible sign of Sargsyan’suncompromised ownership of these obvious challenges and many more others yet to surface.

Hovhannes Nikoghosyan is a Visiting Scholar at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. These views are his own.