As the global security system and liberal norms-based order buckle under the strain of wars in Ukraine and Gaza, peripheral regions of the post-Soviet area find themselves caught in a dangerous zone. While their faith may be resolved, or at least Russia desires so, as part of a bigger deal on Ukraine (like non-membership in NATO), before that happens there is hope shared among big players the status quo in Moldova, Central Asia and South Caucasus will at least deteriorate slowly — while attention and resources are consumed elsewhere. 

The rollout of the U.S.-drafted 28-point Ukraine peace plan has made one thing unmistakably clear: no seat for Europe when negotiating European security. Instead of co-authoring the future security architecture in Europe, EU member states were left to submit commentary on a document they didn’t shape — passed on to Kyiv in the hope that President Zelensky might relay their views to Washington. But Europe’s waning agency is also self-inflicted. With chronic internal disunity (such as on using Russian frozen assets) and no coherent common foreign policy, Brussels is consumed by its own existential questions. The promise that it could meaningfully and sustainably engage in peripheral regions of the post-Soviet space, and primarily in South Caucasus and Moldova, is increasingly unrealistic — and local elites must take this into account. While Azerbaijan may exploit this vacuum to further consolidate authoritarian rule or bite off concessions from Armenia, countries like Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia risk being left exposed, isolated, and unsupported.

One frequent reference lately has been Moldovan elections as a theatre of Russia v. West antagonism. Such analyses of Moldova’s elections often overlook a key truth: while external actors played visible roles, it was ultimately domestic forces that played the game and determined the outcome. Both the EU and Russia did their part and provided cash and political support to their aligned forces. They shaped the narrative, but in practice it was local political dynamics — not foreign engineering — that drove the final result. Both Brussels and Moscow were left to adjust to a new status quo defined by Moldova’s not always democratic, but by all means internal choices.

Public discourse and political agendas in the post-Soviet space are still heavily shaped by outdated normative assumptions — about democracy, international order, and great power alignment — that no longer reflect the realities of today’s world. From the wars in Ukraine and Gaza to the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno Karabakh, the global rules-based order has vanished. This shift is most clearly reflected in the Trump-era National Security Strategy, which laid bare the transactional nature of U.S. foreign policy. Ideological preferences have given way to pragmatic deals: democratic and authoritarian leaders alike are treated as viable partners, and Russian threats — real or perceived — are addressed only insofar as they impact Europe. While adhering to normative language in official statements, EU’s policies - which are divided as ever - are slowly moving to transactional nature as well. Treating Azerbaijan as ‘strategic partner’ says it all.

Among peripheral states, Armenia suffers the most from misreading these changes. Its strategic outlook remains tethered to assumptions that no longer apply, while its leverages — both with neighbors and major powers — have been significantly reduced. 

Risk Management Falls Entirely on Armenia

Efforts to reduce risks and stabilize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey — historically mediated by global powers — are now entirely Armenia's responsibility. Neither Brussels nor Washington has the appetite to wade into another volatile regional dynamic. It’s by this logic that continuous acquiescence and endorsement to ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan bilateral process has to be understood. Moscow, meanwhile, is visibly disengaged and often lacks capacity in the region. The 2020 war in Nagorno Karabakh and its consequences shook the foundations of Russian leverage in the region. The 2024 exit of peacekeepers deployed in Nagorno Karabakh after the mass exodus of the local Armenian population - was just another episode of such decline. 

This leaves a critical gap — and Turkey is stepping into it. Long determined to act as the West’s preferred partner in the region, Ankara is increasingly shaping the regional order on its terms. Moving to open the Armenia-Turkey border ahead of parliamentary elections is only a visible part of the soft game. With Russia and the West disengaged, Turkey is emerging not just as a power broker, but as the default conduit for Western political interests in the South Caucasus: to counterbalance Russia. 

The End of Outsider Arbitration in Armenian Politics

The consequences are not just geopolitical — they are also deeply domestic. For years, Armenian political and civic actors, both before and after the 2018 revolution, have appealed to outside powers for support or arbitration. Whether it was the government, opposition groups or civil society in different crisis episodes, there has been a recurring belief that Washington, Brussels, or Moscow could tip the balance. Quite often outside players used that to build leverages and entrenched networks of influence in Armenian politics.

With all three major players looking away, Armenia's internal political contest is now entirely local. There are no external referees. Occasional support with cash or narrative engineering, like in Moldova, shall not be mistaken for systemic presence. Whether this results in a more self-reliant political culture — or a descent into a zero-sum, no-rules arena — remain plausible scenarios. The current spat between government and the Armenian Church, or strong push against media personalities, are rather signals to a no-rule scenario in the making. The outside players will only adjust their sporadic reactions to how local theatre develops, without resources invested to adjudicate. 

What is clear is that Armenia's elites, opposition, and civil society at large must learn to play the game without waiting for outside actors to validate their grievances or reinforce their legitimacy. The competition, or sometimes struggle, for influence, reform, or status quo preservation must now be fought at home, alone or by building political alliances.

What Comes Next?

In this vacuum of attention, Armenia is both vulnerable and free. Vulnerable, because no external safety net remains. Free, because without heavy international presence, there is room for homegrown policymaking — if there is political will to use it.

But that window also may close fast. Regional actors, especially Turkey, are already moving to shape this space in ways that will be hard to reverse. If Armenian elites - on all fronts - are found unwilling to articulate and then execute a proactive strategy — regionally and domestically — the country risks being locked into a reality designed by others and depriving it of the sovereign agency it used to have.

Hovhannes Nikoghosyan is an Adjunct Assistant Professor, Political Science and International Affairs program at American University of Armenia. These views are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of any institution or organization.