Mediamax’ interview with Tornike Turmanidze, Senior Fellow at Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies

(This interview was recorded on November 27, 2024 – before the start of mass protests in Georgia on November 28).

- Can we say that the process of Georgia’s so-called reorientation is completed, or there is hope that Georgia will go back to the track it has been pursuing for almost three decades?

- Georgia’s geopolitical reorientation away from the West and towards Russia is in progress and it is developing very quickly and it is linked to the fact that Bidzina Ivanishvili and the Georgian Dream are in power. It is their foreign policy choice to isolate from the West, or at least to stop Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration and to get closer with Russia and other authoritarian regimes like China, Iran and others. That is their philosophy.

Of course, they would like to continue relations with both the European Union and the United States, especially after Donald Trump has been re-elected as U.S. President, and they are now working in that direction. But at the moment, Georgia’s European integration is frozen.

Georgian opposition parties and part of the Georgian people who have voted for the opposition and who believe that they have won if it had been a fair fight, are protesting. But as with other authoritarian or autocratic regimes, the Georgian Dream just maintains its grip on power through police force and other repressive mechanisms. And this process started a long time ago, but it became evident after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

- I was going to ask about that – the Georgian Dream has been in power for more than a decade. And this shift or reorientation became visible only recently. So, do you see a direct link between the war in Ukraine and Georgia’s foreign policy change?

- Yes, it was a certain link. From 2012, when the Georgian Dream came to power, and until 2022, when the Russia-Ukraine war started, it maintained an ambiguous foreign policy. On the one hand, they were formally saying that they want European and Euro-Atlantic integration and they took some steps in that direction. But at the same time, they developed a parallel track of pro-Russian orientation, improving economic and political relations with Russia, giving some concessions to Russia in the political field. Although these two tracks were incompatible, Ivanishvili managed to somehow reconcile them. At least it was visible to the part of the Georgian society and to the Western nations that Georgia was trying to maintain a balanced position between Russia and the West.

And unfortunately, some Western governments welcomed this approach because they thought that the previous approach of the Saakashvili government, which was totally pro-Western, ended in a 2008 war. And that’s why maybe it would have been better for Georgia to maintain this balanced relationship.

But this policy of sitting on two chairs ended with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ivanishvili thought that he had to make a choice either in favor of the West or in favor of Russia. And he made a choice in favor of Russia because he believed that Russia would win the war with Ukraine and it was better to stay with Russia and antagonize the West.

Since February 2022, the Georgian government has started a very active anti-Western information campaign, claiming that the United States, the EU and NATO were trying to drag Georgia into war with Russia, that they were asking Georgia to open a second front against Russia, which was obviously a lie. The only thing that Western nations might have been prompting Georgia to do was to join some of the sanctions against Russia. But the Georgian government refused to join the sanctions.

- The South Caucasus looks much more divided today than two or three decades ago, and it seems that Armenia is the only country in the region that wants closer relations with the EU. Do you think Armenia may succeed against the background of Georgia’s reorientation?

- Regional and global dynamics have a big influence on all three countries of the South Caucasus. These countries may have different foreign policies and different domestic developments but they are still tied with one another. So, what happens on the global level and in relations between Russia and the West influences the situation on the ground.

With regards to Armenia, we see that especially after the second Karabakh war and the events in 2023 which we perceive as a punishment by Russia of Armenia, Armenia tries to detach from Russia and develop a pro-Western foreign policy track. But this kind of policy has its limits because there are negative developments in Georgia. Georgia used to be a gateway for Armenia, sort of a connecting link to the West.

Negative developments in Georgia will negatively impact Armenia’s willingness to develop its relations with the West. Armenia may still be able to succeed to a certain extent, but in the long-term, Georgia needs to improve its domestic political situation and get back on the European integration track to positively influence Armenia’s foreign policy. And also with Russia maintaining its influence in Georgia, it would be difficult for Armenia to decrease Russian influence.

After the second Karabakh war Azerbaijan feels more confident. But in my opinion, this confidence is translated in a wrong foreign policy of being closer to Russia and having limited political relations with the West. Azerbaijan approaches the West as only an economic partner and we see that Bidzina Ivanishvili tries to copy Ilham Aliyev’s attitude in this respect.

- After the second Karabakh War, the so-called 3+3 format was created (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia+Russia, Turkey, Iran). The foreign ministers met three times during 4 years, but in fact, it was 2+3 format as Georgia always refrained from participating. Do you think Georgia could join the 3+3 format now?

- Even given the pro-Russian orientation of the Georgian Dream, there is a big problem in our relations with Russia. Russia is de jure and de facto occupying 20 percent of the Georgian territory and it is recognizing Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia as independent states. So engaging in any format with Russia might appear as legitimizing the Russian occupation.

And the Georgian Dream has been refraining from doing that so far. But maybe after the latest fraudulent elections they might even try to join this format. However, there is a political opposition in Georgia, there are people who have overwhelmingly voted against the Georgian Dream and the government might continue refraining from doing that because they would be afraid to create more tension and backlash at home.

The 3+3 format is problematic also because it includes Iran, with whom the West has a very strained relationship. But you should understand that the Georgian government does not make collective decisions. All the decisions, or major decisions at least, are made by Bidzina Ivanishvili. And it’s very hard to predict what calculations this person might make.

Ara Tadevosyan talked to Tornike Turmanidze